Are baseball fans and executives overcomplicating how we use numbers to evaluate baseball players, or is the WAR (Wins Above Replacement) stat just a simple way to streamline all the stats? Or is it even necessary?
When baseball Stats Were Simpler
On my introduction page I recalled my love of baseball cards as a kid. On the backs of these 1971 Topps cards, batters had the following statistics for the 1970 season: games (G), at bats (AB), runs (R), hits (H), doubles (2B), triples (3B), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), stolen bases (SB), and batting average (AVG). Players with competitive Triple Crown stats of HR, RBI, and AVG for hitters and wins (W), strikeouts (SO), and earned run average (ERA) for pitchers My friends and I focused on these stats when trading those cards. Superstar hitters like Tony Perez (40/129/.317), Hank Aaron (38/118/.298), and Carl “Yaz” Yastrzemski (40/102/.329) and pitchers Bob Gibson (23/185/ 3.12), Jim Palmer (20/184/ 2.71) and Gaylord Perry (23/158/ 3.20) had those “sexy” stats (before I was old enough to know what “sexy” meant in any context). On the other hand, we forgot hitters like Jose Arcia (0/17/.223), Tim Cullen (1/18/.214), and Steve Hovley (0/17/.243) and pitchers Frank Reberger (7/21/ 5.57), Nelson Briles (6/76/ 6.24), and Mike Paul (2/33/ 4.89). We put their cards at the bottom of our mom’s shoeboxes where we stored the cards. Topps seemed duplicate or triplicate poor performers cards in a 10 card bubble gum pack while you hunted for the rare Aarons or Palmers.
What does WAR really mean?
The above player stats, however, are part of the discussion on a stat that is becoming increasingly definitive in the eyes of baseball stat fans and GM’s alike: WAR (Wins Above Replacement). It’s supposed to summarize virtually every stat a player can have and give the most comprehensive value that demonstrates his value to his team and how he compares to a theoretical “replacement player.” The link below from Baseball Reference gives you an idea of just how complex a formula WAR can be.
https://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained_wraa.shtml
In other words, this is a baseball mathematician’s trip to Fantasy Island. I wonder what Tattoo’s WAR is?
Single season WAR scores generally range from 0-10. Players who should fear for their jobs range from 0-2, the decent to above average players are between 3-4, the stars are 5’s, and the superstars are usually 6+. Those with negative WAR should probably look for another line of work if their ball clubs haven’t told them already. So let’s look at the WAR the players I previously noted from 1970:
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- Yaz 9.2
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- Tony Perez 7.2
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- Hank Aaron: 5.0
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- Tim Cullen 1.1
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- Steve Hovley: -0.5
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- Jose Arcia: -1.1
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- Bob Gibson 8.9
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- Gaylord Perry 7.6
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- Jim Palmer: 6.4
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- Mike Paul: -0.1
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- Nelson Briles: -1.4
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- Frank Reberger: -1.1
So after all that sophisticated baseball analysis to discover these players WAR, were there any surprises? Did anyone expect to see Arcia above Aaron? Nelson Briles over Gaylord Perry? Would card collecting boys in 1971 be stunned to see WAR in 2026 validated our simpler baseball card analysis?
In taking another look at WAR, check out Baseball Reference’s all time leaders, especially the top 10.
https://www.baseball-reference.com/leaders/WAR_career.shtml
I doubt anybody is shocked to see Babe Ruth and Willie Mays in the top five. Who’s stunned that Ty Cobb and Aaron are in the top 10? Were you really expecting to see the immortal Arcia ahead of Hammerin’ Hank?
A Case For WAR Stats
So where could WAR be useful? For example, take second baseman Eddie Stanky in 1950. He hit 8/51/.300 and his WAR was 8.2. Yes, he was good defensively, hit.300, and he lead the league in walks and on base percentage (OBP). Perhaps WAR makes a case, compared to the more traditional basic baseball stats, that he brings more to the table than the average second baseman. But how do you rank him within a point of Yaz in 1970? Yaz was the complete five tool player who hit for average and power, ran well, had an accurate arm and had superb range and fielding in the outfield. Eliminating WAR, which player would you prefer?
A more contemporary example to Stanky would be Ted Williams. I won’t use 1950 since Williams was injured and played only 89 games, but in 1951 The Splendid Splinter put up 30/126/.318 AND lead the league in walks, OBP (a la Stanky 1950), slugging (SLG), and on base plus slugging percentage (OPS). Though Ted was not considered a great fielder, his glove was also underrated due to his massive hitting stats. In 1951 his fielding percentage of .988 was quite respectable (consider that in 2025 Red Sox outfielder Ceddanne Rafeala won a gold glove with an average of .985). So what was Teddy Ballgame’s WAR in 1951? 7.1. , less than Stanky’s 8.2 in 1950. That’s hard to wrap my Red Sox cap around.
To Go To WAR Stats Or Not
My point in this post is not to dismiss WAR entirely or say that it has no value. I AM asking this question–how necessary is it? If you’re a GM going free agent hunting do you need a WAR rating on a player like an Aaron Judge (9.7 WAR)? Will you already look to cut guys with putrid stats on the mound, in the field, or at the plate…or do you need a negative WAR number to make that decision? Baseball analytics have become so expanded that it takes a degree in accounting to keep up with the math. We’ve heard a lot about “sabermetrics” and “qualitative analysis.” We know Brad Pitt, er, Billy Beane as A’s GM stretched a few bucks as far as possible getting the most from the Scott Hatteburgs of baseball as presented in Moneyball.
Yet think of the Florida Marlins of 2003 lead by “Trader Jack” McKeon. They won the World Series when McKeon was more likely to play “hunches” than complex aggregate numerical theories. Jack’s hunches weren’t always just wild guesses; he knew his players by observing how they performed in specific situations. He knew a player’s on-field character. It’s unlikely any modern metrics would support his starting Josh Beckett on three days rest instead of the normal four to five, but Jack’s hunch paid off as Beckett closed out the Series with a dominating complete game shutout (that’s as rare a stat as you get in this century) win over the Yankees. OTOH, imagine taking away Tony Larussa’s lap top from the dugout. He could be too hamstrung make a choice and stick with it. Perhaps that’s one other reason why he subbed five pitchers per game!
As for me, give me the sexy Triple Crown numbers from baseball cards and leave the WAR to the guys monitoring the modern day Eddie Stankys and Scott Hatteburgs with their calculators, slide rules, and algorithms while they miss watching Aaron Judge changing the course of a game by clearing the bases with a titanic shot.